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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING - DISCLOSURE AND SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS -
OVER-THE-COUNTER INTERNAL ANALGESICS - The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that disclosure of
common ingredients and clinical substantiation of performance
claims or disclosure that certain claims are open to substantial
question in the medical community are reasonable requirements to
counter the effects of extensive advertising found to violate the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
1982).
On February 23, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission (Commis-
sion) filed a complaint against American Home Products Corp.
(AHP), a Delaware corporation,' alleging violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act" in its advertisements for Anacin and Ar-
thritis Pain Formula (APF).3 Specifically, the complaint charged
AHP with making false claims about Anacin by advertising its
product as a unique pain-killing preparation4 proven superior in
1. American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 683 (3d Cir. 1982). Clyne
Maxon, Inc., the advertising agency for AHP, was also named in the complaint. The adver-
tising agency did not petition for a review of those parts of the Order regarding its future
obligations, however, because it had gone out of business. Id. at n.1. On the same day, the
Commission filed similar complaints against Bristol-Meyers Company and Sterling Drug,
Inc., manufacturers of Bufferin and Excedrin, and Bayer Aspirin, respectively. The cases
were still on appeal with the Commission and were not considered by the American Home
Products court. Id. at 683. See infra note 144, regarding the FTC's decision in these cases.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 5 & 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 & 52 (1976). Subsections
quoted in this opinion include:
§ 45(a)(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
§ 52(a) It shall be unlawful... to disseminate any false advertisement ... [b]y any
means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly,
the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.
§ 52(b) The dissemination . . . of any false advertisement within the provisions of
subsection (a) . . . shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . within the
meaning of section 45.
The court found the definition of "false advertisement" to be very broad, encompassing not
only literally untrue advertisements, but also those materially misleading as much for what
is said as for what is not said in them. 695 F.2d at 684.
3. 695 F.2d at 683.
4. Anacin is a non-prescription analgesic containing 400 milligrams of aspirin and 32.5
milligrams of caffeine per tablet. Inasmuch as caffeine is not claimed to have any pain-
killing properties either alone or with aspirin, the only analgesic component is the aspirin.
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effectiveness to all other non-prescription analgesics. The Commis-
sion also cited as misrepresentations AHP's assertions that Anacin
is a tension reliever and that APF causes fewer side effects and
hence is superior to competing products.' AHP responded by stat-
ing that it had not made the advertising claims alleged, and that
claims it had made were truthful.'
Extensive hearings were conducted,' culminating in the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's (A.L.J.) initial decision, dated September 1,
1978.8 The A.L.J. decided most issues in favor of complaint coun-
sel, and on cross appeals, the Commission issued a cease and desist
order on September 9, 1981, upholding the A.L.J. in nearly all re-
spects.' The A.L.J.'s findings of fact and conclusions of law were
adopted by the Commission, but where the A.L.J. spoke of "unfair
and deceptive" practices, the Commission limited the Order in
terms of deception.10 The focus in both decisions, however, was on
the ability of the advertisements to mislead."
In brief, Part I of the Commission's Order was applicable to
Anacin, APF, and any other of AHP's non-prescription internal
analgesics. Part I(A) required AHP to support representations of
established or proven superiority 2 with a minimum of two prop-
erly controlled clinical studies. I(B) required such statistical sup-
Id. This compares with 325 milligrams of aspirin in an "ordinary" aspirin tablet. APF is
similarly a non-prescription analgesic and contains 486 milligrams of "micronized" (or small
particles of) aspirin with two antacids. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See American Home Products Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), modified, 695 F.2d 681
(3d Cir. 1982). The A.L.J. recorded in his initial decision:
The parties were allowed extensive pretrial discovery. Numerous prehearing confer-
ences were held .... Joint evidentiary hearings commenced on June 6, 1977 and
continued until August 15, 1977 [and] complaint counsel's case-in-chief.., began on
November 1, 1977 and continued until December 19, 1977 .... Respondents com-
menced their defense on January 30, 1978 and continued until March 22, 1978 ....
Some 40 witnesses, including 27 expert[s] . . . testified. Transcripts of hearing ...
number some 11,600 pages. Some 400 documentary exhibits, including numerous
copy tests, penetration and image studies, and medical-scientific studies were re-
ceived in evidence.
98 F.T.C. at 146, 149.
8. 695 F.2d at 684.
9. Id. An appendix is included in the court's opinion, id. at 714-16, with key parts of
the Commission's Order which are at issue and extensively discussed in the case. See infra
notes 14, 20 & 21.
10. 695 F.2d at 684.
11. Id. The Commission denied a rehearing and noted that the difference in terminol-
ogy was "more of form than of substance." Id.
12. Id. The claims of superiority in question were related to effectiveness or freedom
from side effects in comparison to other products. Id.
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port even when the advertisements were not making overt claims
of superiority.18 Further, this provision did not allow AHP to make
unequivocal claims in the absence of two or more clinical investiga-
tions, although it may assert superiority in that instance only if it
discloses such a claim as open to substantial question."
Part II applied to all of AHP's non-prescription drugs and was
thus more inclusive than Part I." Part II(A) prohibited AHP from
claiming a product has special or unique ingredients when the ac-
tual ingredient is common to other non-prescription drugs of simi-
lar usage.16 II(B) required AHP to cease falsely representing that
any of its non-prescription drugs contained more of a particular
active ingredient that its competitors' products.1 7 II(C) proscribed
the misrepresentation of test results on product effectiveness or
freedom from side effects.18 II(D), described as "especially far-
reaching,"1 9 required AHP to have a reasonable basis for non-com-
parative claims of product performance or to cease making such
claims altogether.20
13. The court noted, that Part I(B) was the only provision not supported unani-
mously. Commissioner Clanton objected in a separate statement. Id. at 684 n.4. See infra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
14. 695 F.2d at 684. Parts I(A) and (B) of the Order state in pertinent part:
It is ordered, [tihat . . .American Home Products Corporation . . . in connection
with the advertising of "Anacin," "Arthritis Pain Formula," or any other non-pre-
scription internal analgesic product ... do forthwith cease and desist from:
A. Making any representation, directly or by implication, that a claim concerning the
superior effectiveness or superior freedom from side effects of such product has been
established or proven unless such representation has been established by two or more
adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations ....
B. Making any representation, directly or by implication, of superior effectiveness or
freedom from side effects of such product unless:
1. The superior effectiveness or superior freedom from side effects so represented has
been established according to the terms set forth in paragraph I.A. of this Order, or
2. Each advertisement containing such representation contains a clear and conspicu-
ous disclosure that there is a substantial question about the validity of the compara-
tive efficacy or side effects claim, or that the claim has not been proven ....
98 F.T.C. at 423, 425.
15. The court in discussing this provision of the Order graphically referred to it as
"fencing in," meaning that it is broadly drafted to effectively "close all roads to the prohib-
ited goal." 695 F.2d at 704.




20. Id. Parts II(A)-(D) of the Order state in pertinent part:
It is further ordered, [t]hat . . .American Home Products Corporation . . . in con-
nection with the advertising. . . of "Anacin," "Arthritis Pain Formula," or any other
non-prescription drug product . . . do forthwith cease and desist from:
A. Making any representation, directly or by implication, that such product contains
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The third part of the Commission's Order required conspicuous
disclosure of aspirin content whenever an Anacin or APF adver-
tisement makes a performance claim.21 Part IV, uncontested by
AHP, directed the corporation to cease representing Anacin as a
tension, nerve, anxiety or depression reliever.2 s
The Order operated prospectively and was designed not to pun-
ish for past deceptive practices, but to ensure that public miscon-
ceptions about the products derived from years of misleading ad-
vertisements were not confirmed or further exacerbated. 4
Additionally, the order was triggered only when AHP made partic-
ular kinds of claims and, at that point, imposed an obligation to
provide certain information to the public.25
AHP's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 21,
1982, although two commissioners stated in separate opinions that
the Commission should exercise its discretion and stay the Order
or reconsider it in light of the cases pending against AHP's com-
petitors, to guarantee consistency of treatment.
26
AHP sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, asking that Parts I, II(D), and III be vacated,
and Parts II(A)-(C) be restricted to Anacin and APF.
Deciding the case on December 3, 1982, Judge Adams began his
any unusual or special ingredient when such ingredient is commonly used in other
non-prescription drug products ....
B. Making any false representation that such product has more of an active ingredi-
ent than any class of competing products.
C. Misrepresenting in any manner any test, study or survey or any of the results
thereof, concerning the comparative effectiveness or freedom from side effects of such
product.
D. Making any noncomparative representation, directly or by implication, concerning
the effectiveness or freedom from side effects of such product unless, at the time such
representation is made, respondent has a reasonable basis for such representation
which shall consist of competent and reliable scientific evidence.
98 F.T.C. at 425-26.
21. 695 F.2d at 685. Part III of the Order states, in pertinent part:
It is further ordered, [tihat . . . American Home Products Corporation . . . in con-
nection with the advertising. . . of "Anacin." "Arthritis Pain Formula," or any prod-
ucts in which "Anacin" or "Arthritis Pain Formula" is used in the name . . . do
forthwith cease and desist from failing to disclose clearly and conspicuously that the
analgesic ingredient in such product is aspirin, when such is the case and when the
advertisement makes any performance claim for the product.
98 F.T.C. at 426.




26. See supra note 1.
27. 695 F.2d at 685.
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discussion in this unanimous opinion by addressing AHP's chal-
lenges to Part I, which involved clinical support for Anacin and
APF superiority claims.28 AHP denied making claims of proven su-
periority and charged the Commission with not having substantial
evidence to support this finding or the allegation that such claims,
if made, were misleading.29 Further, AHP based its due process
challenge on a change in theory of liability as the case made its
way through the administrative proceedings.80
First, Judge Adams established the standard of review to be fol-
lowed by the court. He found that 15 U.S.C. § 45(c), as interpreted
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court, mandates a deference to Com-
mission findings of fact.3 1 He further found that although defining
"deceptive practices" is a matter for the judiciary,3 2 if the Commis-
sion finds particular advertisements are deceptive or have a ten-
dency to mislead, its determination is more a finding of fact than a
conclusion of law." Judge Adams determined that the policy sup-
porting such judicial deference was sound because the Commission
is uniquely qualified to determine when a practice is misleading to
the public based on its years of experience applying the law."
Next, Judge Adams decided in what manner advertising is to be
interpreted. He stated that the generally accepted method 5 is to
view the advertisement as a whole.3" Words and phrases are not to
be lifted from their context and literal truth or falsity is to give
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 685-86. Judge Adams emphasized that the advertisements in question were
meant to be taken seriously and were never defended as mere "puffing."
31. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). The reviewing court is permitted only to
decide whether or not the record contains the quantum of relevant evidence a reasonable
person would find to be adequate to support a given finding, rather than to actually weigh
the evidence. 695 F.2d at 686.
32. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
33. 695 F.2d at 686. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) ("substantial evidence" standard applied to Commission's
finding of deceptiveness).
34. 695 F.2d at 686. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
Judge Adams noted that utilization of the Commission's expertise in this area is critical
when the deception found is created by an omission of information from the advertisements
under consideration. See, e.g., Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1978). He further stated that cases relied on by the petitioner did not question the
deferential standard of review. 695 F.2d at 686-87 n.8.
35. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 983 (1977).
36. 695 F.2d at 687.
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way to the general impression created by the advertiser.3 7 He ad-
mitted that on some key points the Commission did not have di-
rect evidence of consumers actually being misled, but he found
such evidence is not required."8 The Commission analyzed the tele-
vision advertisements with reference not only to the words used,
but also to their aural and visual components.39 Judge Adams
found this consistent with the overall impression standard and
with the notion that not allowing those parts of the advertising
medium to be examined would give advertisers an open-ended op-
portunity to deceive.'
In applying these standards, the court turned to Part I(A) of the
Order, which required representations of established or proven su-
periority to be supported by clinical studies, and asked if the es-
tablishment claims" had been made by AHP's advertisements.
Judge Adams answered the question affirmatively, finding that the
survey evidence offered by AHP had been considered in detail by
the A.L.J. and reasons were cited for the limited weight given to
AHP's proffered expert testimony."' Judge Adams compared this
process with the semantic analysis which AHP urged upon the
37. See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 161 n.4 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (FTC stated that an advertisement is misleading if
even one possible interpretation is false); Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962,
964 (9th Cir. 1975) (if advertisement can be interpreted in misleading way, it is to be con-
strued against the advertiser); J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967)
(FTC not bound to literal interpretation of words); Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d
523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963) (FTC may extend its interpretation of advertisements beyond literal
meaning of words to overall impact); Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258, 261 (3d
Cir. 1962) (deception by innuendo can support finding that advertisement is false); Murray
Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (factfinder must look at more
than technical meanings of phrases; overall impression likely to be made on public is stan-
dard). Cf. C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARcIssIsM 140-41 (1979) (criticizing product advertis-
ing for the blurring of falsehood and truth, and not for obvious falsity).
38. 695 F.2d at 687. See Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th
Cir. 1975). See also Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.11 (9th Cir.
1978) (stating the FTC need not produce consumer testimony because it has the expertise to
determine if advertising will be deceptive to the public).
39. 695 F.2d at 688.
40. Id. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978) (pre-
dominant misleading visual message not corrected by verbal message in ad); FTC v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1965) (product demonstration creates false im-
pression when viewers not told it has been recreated by use of "mock-ups").
41. 695 F.2d at 688. When Judge Adams referred to "establishment claim" he meant
AHP's respresentations of the proven superiority of Anacin. He pointed out that establish-
ment claims were not found by the Commission in APF advertisements and that petitioner
did not challenge the language in I(A) which encompassed APF and claims of proven supe-
rior freedom from side effects. Id. n.12.
42. Id. at 688-89.
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court and which the court rejected in favor of a "pragmatic"
approach.4
Sample Anacin advertisements from magazines were reproduced
in the opinion.44 The court agreed with the A.L.J. and the Com-
mission's statement that the first of the advertisements could rea-
sonably be construed by consumers to mean Anacin is equivalent
in effectiveness to prescription drugs, and since it is claimed to
have more pain reliever than non-prescription products, that
Anacin is proven to be more effective than the latter.4" Considering
the second of the two advertisements,46 the court again contrasted
the literal reading with the reading it was reasonable to assume
consumers would make.47
The next question addressed by the court, was whether or not
the establishment claims were deceptive. 48 Although AHP never
disclosed the actual ingredients in its advertisements, the superior-
ity of Anacin was apparently based on the idea that the relatively
higher dosage of aspirin made it more effective as a pain reliever. 49
The Commission found that AHP's evidence was inadequate to
support the superiority claims and that the types of data required
by scientists to prove such claims involve criteria which are not
disputed by the scientific community. 50 Again, the court stated it
was unable to find the action of the Commission unreasonable.
5 1
43. Id. at 689 n.13. The pragmatic analysis does not deal with words in their literal
sense, rather with what those words imply when uttered in a given context. Id.
44. Id. at 689-90. Pertinent portions of the first advertisement considered read as fol-
lows: "I]t has now been proven beyond a doubt that today's Anacin delivers the same com-
plete headache relief as the leading pain relief prescription. . . .Doctors know Anacin con-
tains more of the specific medication they recommend most for pain than the leading
aspirin, buffered aspirin, or extra-strength tablet." Id. at 689.
45. Id. The court stated that the A.L.J. and Commission found no clinical support for
the claims as they were literally presented, although this was not the fundamental objection
to the advertisement for the purposes of this part of the Order.
46. Id. at 690. "What's best to take for tension and headache pain? .. .[TIake the
fast acting pain-reliever doctors recommend most. . . .Anacin Tablets. . . .Next time a
tension headache strikes, see if medically-proven Anacin doesn't work better for you." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 691. According to the Court, AHP apparently agreed that some of its prod-
uct claims were misleading, although it maintained that none of them was an establishment
claim. Id. n.16.
49. Id. at 691.
50. AHP apparently objected to the level of proof required and contended that this
was an imposition of a higher standard for comparative claims than the FDA requires to
establish drug effectiveness. The Commission carefully explained that its "well-established
principles of scientific investigation" criteria were consistent with FDA regulations. Id. n.17.
51. Id. at 691-92. A dose response curve relied upon by AHP was also found to be
insufficient to support its claims because most points on the curve could not be proven by
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Judge Adams cited numerous appellate decisions 2 which allow the
Commission to order substantiation of advertising claims, and of-
fered Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC53 as an example of even more
far-reaching court-approved requirements."
AHP's next claim, denial of administrative due process, was also
rejected by the court. AHP believed that the theory underlying
Part I(B) of the Order, requiring disclosure of a substantial ques-
tion when advertising claims lack clinical support, was changed fol-
lowing the initial complaint. AHP charged that notice of the
change had not been given and that the A.L.J. excluded evidence
which was relevant to the theory on which AHP was found liable."
Judge Adams found that AHP's evidence of a change in theory was
clinical studies. Id. at 692. Anacin contains 150 mg. more aspirin than common aspirin, and
at dosage levels above a given point (600 mg.) it is found that substantial increases are
required to produce small increases in relief from pain. The" Commission also rejected
Anacin's favorable comparison claims with Darvon Compound 65, which is a leading pre-
scription analgesic. Id. n.19. Other evidence in the record showed expert witnesses did not
believe Anacin to be superior and in fact might be inferior to ordinary aspirin because the
caffeine in it could either increase perception of pain or further worsen aspirin's gastrointes-
tinal side effects. Id. at 692.
52. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982) (reasonable substan-
tiation of major appliance performance claims upheld); Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d
364 (9th Cir. 1982) (substantiation of product claims part of order not appealed to FTC,
therefore not properly before the court); Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (requirement of substantiation is clearly permissible
method of regulation); Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
818 (1976) (part of order forbidding air-conditioning capability claims unless based upon
competent scientific or engineering material upheld by court); National Dynamics Corp. v.
FTC, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974) (FTC order requiring bat-
tery-additive manufacturer to support performance claims with laboratory tests found rea-
sonably related to misrepresentations); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973) (court affirmed FTC order requiring Firestone
to substantiate certain claims of tire performance with competent scientific testing).
53. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (the order restricted
representations concerning any food, drug, cosmetic, or device and required health risk
warnings for specific products).
54. 695 F.2d at 693.
55. AHP relied on 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (1976) which requires timely notice of matters
of law, and on Rodale Press, Inc. v. FTC, 407 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where it was stated
that "it is well settled that an agency may not change theories in midstream without giving
respondents reasonable notice of the change." 695 F.2d at 693 n.21. The essence of AHP's
charge was that the Commission's complaint alleged a "substantial question" regarding
proof of Anacin and APF superiority claims and that failure to disclose this information in
advertisements was misleading. Id. at 693. AHP believed this expressed theory was actually
a subterfuge for the "reasonable basis" doctrine of Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972), where
advertisers were required to possess and rely on an adequate reasonable basis for product
claims. 695 F.2d at 693. The question was seen to be a factual issue in Pfizer, and the
possibility of valid scientific or medical studies being required to support some claims was
noted. Id. at 693-94.
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derived from a particular statement in the A.L.J.'s opinion, 5e and
decided that this was a strained interpretation in light of its con-
text.57 According to the court, the Commission, in affirming the
A.L.J.'s decision, took a different approach to the "substantial
question" theory which underlies Part I(B).58 Complaint counsel
and the A.L.J. had characterized the doctrine as something new,
but the Commission, citing Pfizer, Inc.," saw it merely as a logical
elaboration of the "reasonable basis" theory,60 and decided two or
more well-controlled clinical tests would be the acceptable method
of supporting drug performance claims.6' Because the Commission
determined that an advertiser could, in certain situations, lack a
"reasonable basis" for a claim when there was a "substantial ques-
tion" concerning its truth, any evidence tending to establish the
former without tending to eliminate the latter would not have been
relevant.62
Turning to the merits of Part I(B), the court found AHP's objec-
tions were analogous to those made against Part I(A) and, employ-
ing a similar analysis, concluded that, according to a valid Com-
mission interpretation, the superiority claims were made and that
such claims were deceptive.6" The court dealt at considerable
length with the deception issue, beginning with a caveat indicating
that it would support only the Commission's narrow application of
56. The excerpt from the A.L.J.'s opinion upon which AHP based its denial of due
process argument reads: "[a]gainst this background, what is the reasonable level of substan-
tiation required under the fairness doctrine for a claim that Anacin is more effective than
aspirin. . .?" Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
57. Id. Judge Adams stated that the A.L.J. only used the term "reasonable" to frame
the issue. The A.L.J. had actually applied the "substantial question" test because he found
that consumers of over the counter analgesics are deceived by superiority claims which ex-
perts recognize as being open to substantial question. The A.L.J. found it reasonable to
require two clinical studies to support superior effectiveness claims. Id.
58. See supra note 55.
59. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). See supra note 55.
60. The Commission stated that lack of a reasonable basis to support certain product
claims is deceptive and that failing to disclose the nonexistence of support which presuma-
bly underlies some claims would, by mere elaboration, also be a deceptive practice. 695 F.2d
at 694.
61. Id. at 695. The court did not think the case had been decided on a "reasonable
basis" theory, however, and pointed out that no allegation had been made that the Commis-
sion had abused its discretion by setting forth the "substantial question" doctrine in an
adjudicative rather than a rulemaking setting. Id. at 695 n.22.
62. Id. at 695. AHP also claimed the experts called by the Commission were not que-
ried about the "substantial question" issue, but the court disagreed, observing that AHP
could not have failed to understand due to the nature of the testimony regarding acceptable
scientific procedures that the issue was indeed being addressed. Id.
63. Id. at 696.
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the ruling rather than holding that such a provision could apply to
any product claims for any drugs. 4
Judge Adams refuted AHP's assertion that Part I(B) is obscure
by stating as its central idea that consumers should be able to as-
sume that when a factual, verifiable statement is made in an adver-
tisement in no uncertain terms, the appropriate tests to support
such a claim have been conducted." AHP further disagreed with
the Commission over how much support is required when failure to
reveal the nonexistence of the support would be misleading, and
apparently believed two clinical studies constituted too stringent a
requirement." The court found AHP's challenges went to an issue
of fact, and reiterated the canon of judicial deference to Commis-
sion findings of fact."
The policy reasons behind a high level of proof, which the court
held justifiable, were grouped into two categories based on the par-
ticular nature of the product and AHP's conduct.68 Petitioner's be-
havior was found to warrant the measures imposed by the Com-
mission, because AHP had conducted a very long and successful
campaign to convince the public of Anacin's and APF's superior-
64. Id. The court quoted the Commission on this point as follows: "When an analgesic
advertiser claims its product to be superior in performance, even without the additional
explicit claim that it has been so proven, it is reasonable for consumers to construe that
claim to be the assertion of a fact that is generally accepted, within the scientific commu-
nity, as established." The court did not think the Commission could require the advertiser
to indicate a substantial question existed in all cases. Id.
65. Id. at 697. The court also stressed the fact that certain claims of drug performance,
such as superior effectiveness or freedom from side effects, are factual and testable. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court found that prescription and, by reasonable extension, non-prescrip-
tion drugs are subject to wide-ranging government regulation and that consumers would
tend to expect that performance and safety claims were based not on the advertiser's opin-
ion, but on the results of FDA evaluation of the product. See Simeon Management Corp. v.
FTC., 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978). The court also noted that another reason to allow
a high standard of substantiation for comparative effectiveness and safety claims for pain
relief products was the consumer's inability to easily evaluate the claims by using the prod-
ucts. 695 F.2d at 698. The factors for this evaluation problem include: 1) pain which is not
extreme eventually goes away whether or not the consumer takes anything for it; 2) memory
problems could preclude product comparison; 3) intensity of pain varies, also interfering
with reliable personal judgment when comparing products; and 4) a placebo effect had been
found in clinical studies where pain relief was experienced with pharmacologically inactive
drugs between 30% and 60% of the time. Id. Health risks associated with use of aspirin
were also cited by the court. Id. at 698-99. Gastrointestinal bleeding with a 4% to 10%
mortality rate and gastric ulcers requiring hospitalization, thought by the court to be partic-
ularly serious side effects, made AHP's representations of gentleness to the stomach without
disclosure of its products' main ingredient a real hazard to those sensitive to aspirin. Id. at
699 n.31.
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ity.s9 Part I(B) was designed to undo damage previously done with-
out being overly intrusive and to prevent any future infliction of
damage."
The court cited and discussed National Commission on Egg Nu-
trition v. FTC7 1 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,72 Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC,73 and Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC,7 to support
the proposition that the Commission has been given wide latitude
when ordering advertisers to make disclosures limiting or counter-
acting certain claims.7 '
Judge Adams addressed Commissioner Clanton's dissent from
Part I(B) of the Order,76 finding that Commissioner Clanton ob-
jected because he thought that the majority had adopted a per se
rule which would require that any comparative drug claim be
backed by scientific proof.77 Commissioner Clanton maintained
drug claims should be considered on a case by case basis .7 The
court, however, did not find the Commission had adopted such a
rigid rule, and indicated the lengths to which the Commission had
gone in shaping its Order to fit the specific facts of the case at
hand.y
The court then turned to Part II of the Order and examined
AHP's contention that the provisions prohibiting certain claims
69. Id. at 699.
70. Id.
71. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). The FTC ordered
egg producers to accompany representations about egg consumption and heart and circula-
tory disease with a conspicuous disclosure indicating medical experts link increased egg con-
sumption (i.e., dietary cholestrol) to the risk of heart disease. The Seventh Circuit upheld
the order despite the absence of a long history of deception.
72. 380 U.S. 374 (1965). The Commission had found that televised "tests" were mis-
leading because of undisclosed use of props, and gave the advertiser alternatives similar to
those given to AHP under Part I(B). The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed.
73. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). The Commission
required the makers of Listerine to employ corrective measures until a specified amount had
been spent on advertising. The Order was more burdensome than in AHP's case, however,
because disclosures about the product not preventing colds or lessening their severity had to
accompany any advertising claim.
74. 579 F. 2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978) (safety and effectiveness of weight loss pro-
gram found to violate Federal Trade Commission Act even though no claim was made that a
government agency approved the program).
75. 695 F.2d at 700-01.
76. Id. at 701. 98 F.T.C. at 417 (Commissioner Clanton, dissenting).
77. 695 F.2d at 701. See 98 F.T.C. at 420 (Commissioner Clanton, dissenting).
78. 98 F.T.C. at 420-21 (Commissioner Clanton, dissenting).
79. 695 F.2d Pt 701. Judge Adams remarked that an unyielding use of the "substantial
question" provision in another case might be cause for judicial modification of a Commis-
sion order in the future. Id. at 701-02.
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were unsupportably broad and that the part requiring a reasonable
basis for non-comparative claims was ambiguous and should be va-
cated in its entirety.80 Judge Adams first discussed the findings of
fact underlying this part of the Order, which applied to all non-
prescription drugs, noting AHP never defended itself during the
proceedings by claiming Anacin or APF contained special or
unique pain-killing ingredients. 81 The Commission determined that
the advertisements" for these products, since they were specifi-
cally designed to differentiate the products from ordinary aspirin,
had the capacity to mislead consumers by failing to reveal aspirin
content.83 The claims of AHP's use of more active ingredients as
compared with competitors' products were also found to be false."
The facts supporting Part IH(C) included AHP's misrepresenta-
tions of product comparison test results and surveys of doctors.85
Underlying the broad II(D) provision was the rather narrow Com-
mission finding of the lack of a reasonable basis for AHP's non-
comparative claim that Anacin offers relief from tension. There
was no basis for such a claim and the court decided AHP adver-
tisements would lead consumers to believe this claim was being
made. 7
Another preliminary question addressed by the court was
whether or not the Commission had discretion to "fence in" viola-
tors.88 Judge Adams cited several cases which support the princi-
ples that: (1) the Commission has responsibility for fashioning or-
80. Id. at 702. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
81. 695 F.2d at 702.
82. A sample advertisement quoted by the court reads in pertinent part: "Anacin tab-
lets are so effective because they are like a doctor's prescription. . . . Anacin contains the
pain reliever most recommended by doctors plus an extra active ingredient not found in
leading buffered aspirin . . . . The big difference in Anacin makes a difference in the way
you feel." Id.
83. Id. Expert testimony and consumer surveys on which the Commission relied, show
that many consumers had no idea Anacin contains aspirin and believed it to be superior to
aspirin. Id.
84. Id. Arthritis Strength Bufferin, Midol, Cope, and Arthritis Pain Formula contain
larger doses of aspirin. Id. at 703. Similarly, claims conveying an impression that Anacin has
twice as much pain reliever as other non-prescription products were deemed even more mis-
leading. Id.
85. Id. at 703.
86. Id. In this regard, the court noted AHP did not challenge Part IV which proscribes
tension relief claims, although AHP had suggested such a provision was moot because it was
no longer making such assertions in its advertisements. The court found this behavior had
not been voluntary, however, in that AHP discontinued such advertisements following initi-
ation of the Commission proceedings against it. Id. n.38.
87. Id. at 704.
88. Id. at 704-06. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ders;89 (2) violators must expect to be "fenced in"' 0 because ways
of avoiding proscriptions are limited only by human inventive-
ness;91 and (3) the courts should not be quick to modify Commis-
sion orders." The court observed that deference to the Commis-
sion's discretion is limited where the remedy selected has no
reasonable relation to the existing illegal conduct.9a A second limi-
tation was found in Colgate-Palmolive," where the Supreme Court
stated that an order's prohibitions had to be framed in language as
clear and precise as circumstances permit.
9 5
Further, Judge Adams noted "fencing in" could take the form of
multiple product orders and stated the Supreme Court had upheld
in Colgate-Palmolive" an all-product order in a situation where
only three advertisements for a single product were involved.9 7 The
question to be answered by a court when deciding if such an order
is justified is: whether or not the advertiser is likely to commit the
type of conduct proscribed by the order.'8 According to the court,
factors important to this issue include the deliberateness and seri-
89. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1956) (Congress gave primary re-
sponsibility for fashioning orders to the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission
Act).
90. Id. at 431.
91. See Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 1982) (in striking
balance between violations found and effective orders, FTC fences in violators out of neces-
sity due to range of human inventiveness in transferring misleading advertising campaigns
from product to product).
92. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391 (1965) (courts should not
lightly modify orders because FTC has wide discretion in and primary responsibility for
fashioning orders).
93. 695 F.2d at 704. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946), where
the Court stated:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to elimi-
nate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide
latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy se-
lected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.
Id. The American Home Products court, in addition, cited other cases applying the Jacob
Siegel "reasonable relation" test. 695 F.2d at 704.
94. 380 U.S. at 392.
95. 695 F.2d at 704-05. The policy favoring specific language in Commission orders
was elucidated in terms of problems with meaning and application for reviewing courts
when general language is employed, and the possibility that penalties and enforcement pro-
cedures set out in the Federal Trade Commission Act could be altered when the courts are
asked to penalize those violating Commission orders without the benefit of the agency hear-
ing process. See Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 371 (9th Cir. 1982); Standard Oil
Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Colgate-Palmolive, 380
U.S. at 392.
96. 380 U.S. St 394-95.
97. 695 F.2d at 705.
98. Id. at 706. See Litton Indus., 676 F.2d at 370.
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ousness of the violation subject to present consideration, the ad-
vertiser's past record in the area of deceptive or unfair trade prac-
tices, the transferability of such a practice to other products, and
the consequences of a failure to fence in a violator." Of the latter
criterion, the court stated that potential health hazards flowing
from drug use could be the foundation for justifiable breadth in
Commission orders. 100 Having dealt with the underlying facts and
the law controlling the Commission's discretion when drafting or-
ders, and finding all of the above enumerated factors to be present,
the court decided Parts II(A)-(C) should stand as written. 10'
Judge Adams found the violations to be both serious and delib-
erate, noting AHP's long-standing and massive campaigns0 2 to
convince the public that Anacin differed from and was superior to
common aspirin and its competition. 03 He also found AHP to have
a prior record of habitual violations of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 04 and that the types of claims it made were readily trans-
99. 695 F.2d at 706. See Sears, Roebuck, 676 F.2d at 392. Judge Adams quoted further
from Sears, Roebuck to show that the Commission would be wasting its resources if it were
required to institute separate proceedings each time an advertiser transferred successful but
illegal techniques from product to product. 695 F.2d at 706 n.41.
100. 695 F.2d at 706. The court opined that predictions regarding future behavior were
dependent upon determinations which the Commission, rather than the courts, was in the
better position to make. Id.
101. Id. The court examined the cases which AHP cited in support of its attack on
Parts II(A)-(C) and decided such precedents were not applicable to the instant case. Id. at
708-09. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1978). In
that case only three advertisements for a single product were misleading and the order ap-
plied to thousands of diverse products. Judge Adams noted that the violators had made a
good faith effort to eliminate the misleading implications in their advertisements. 695 F.2d
at 709. See also American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1968). The
Preparation H case appeared to hold that a multi-product order could not stand based on a
violation involving a single product unless habitual violation of the Act had been estab-
lished, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sears, Roebuck held the courts "regularly
refused to follow such reasoning." Judge Adams also discussed the cases which AHP tried to
distinguish, Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982) and Sears, Roebuck, but
found AHP's effort to be unavailing. 695 F.2d at 709. Judge Adams stated that the multi-
product orders involved in these two cases were comparable to the present order against
AHP, and that the relationship of order coverage and the total number of products sold was
not a relevant issue. 695 F.2d at 709.
102. The court reproduced the A.L.J.'s findings that AHP had spent $210 million on
Anacin advertisements in print and broadcast media between 1960 and 1970. 695 F.2d at
708 n.43. The sample offending advertisements in this opinion were generally introduced as
representative of dozens of others. See supra notes 44, 46 & 82.
103. 695 F.2d at 707.
104. Three prior litigated cease and desist orders against AHP for similar violations of
the Act were: American Home Products Corp., 70 F.T.C. 1524 (1966), affd in part, modified
in part, American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1968) (representa-
tions that Preparation H could provide anything more than temporary relief found to be
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ferable to its other products. 10 5
Section III(D) of the court's opinion addressed the challenge
made by AHP to Part II(D) of the Commission's Order and ad-
vanced the grounds for supporting that challenge. The phrase
"reasonable basis," since it had not been adequately defined by the
Commission and since it covered any non-prescription drugs and
any non-comparative claims of effectiveness or freedom from side
effects, was struck down for vagueness and overbreadth. 1 6 The
court found the Commission's justification for an all-encompassing
provision to be based on AHP's comparative claims and the one
non-comparative claim that Anacin relieves tension. 107 Judge Ad-
ams feared an order approaching the scope of statutory provisions
would shift enforcement from the Commission to the courts. 08 He
also stated that the Commission did not adequately support its
contention that AHP was likely to make false non-comparative
claims. 0 9 Further, Judge Adams could find no explanation by the
Commission for such an imprecise proscription." 0
With respect to Part III of the Order,"' AHP argued that since
other parts of the Order would ensure an end to deceptive claims
about Anacin and APF ingredients, a disclosure requirement that
the products contain aspirin would be a violation of first amend-
ment guarantees of free speech." ' The Commission had justified
such a measure on the basis that public misconceptions about the
products needed correction and AHP's history of related advertis-
false); American Home Products Corp., 63 F.T.C. 933 (1963) (AHP ordered to cease falsely
representing that liquid anesthetic, Outgro, could cure ingrown toenails); and Wyeth Chemi-
cal Co., 29 F.T.C. 281 (1939) (claims that Freezone removes and cures corns and callouses
found to be misleading).
105. 695 F.2d at 708. Misrepresentations of commonly found ingredients, test results
and doctor preference surveys were found to be easily transferred to AHP's other products.
Id.
106. Id. at 710.
107. Id. This claim was already covered, the court found, by Part IV of the Order. Id.
at 711.
108. Id. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1978);
American Home Products Corp v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1968). When an order's
prohibitions closely resemble statutory prohibitions, the courts become the primary inter-
preters and enforcers of the statute. 695 F.2d at 710.
109. 695 F.2d at 711.
110. Id. at 711 n.47. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). Judge Adams implied that deleting this part might be
inconsistent with Porter & Dietsch, because the court in that case had found an all-product
order to be justifiably broad. 695 F.2d at 705 n.40.
111. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
112. 695 F.2d at 712.
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ing violations indicated that AHP had many ways of misrepresent-
ing the contents of its products."' 3 The court upheld the Commis-
sion's judgment on the basis of the Jacob Siegel "reasonable
relation" test and "fencing in" precedents."1 4
AHP alleged that Part III was a burdensome prior restraint and
only an affirmative misrepresentation could be barred as decep-
tive.' 1 The court found, however, it would be less of a burden for
AHP to admit that Anacin and APF contain aspirin than to con-
tinue the practice of going on at length in its advertisements con-
cealing that fact."1 " The court further stated that this provision is
triggered only when AHP is making performance claims, thus
other kinds of advertising could be exempt from its strictures."
7
Judge Adams found that the commercial free speech cases relied
upon by AHP were no help to its cause, for in general, they pro-
mote the concept of requiring qualifying explanatory language as
opposed to excision of offending claims." 8 He also pointed out that
the extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech
was intended to enhance the "clean" flow of information," 9 and
that AHP's intent to conceal the nature of its product would be a
subversion of that doctrine.1
2 0
Judge Adams concluded that the Order should be enforced as
modified by the deletion of the part requiring a reasonable basis
for non-comparative claims of product performance. In the interest
of fairness, he thought the Commission should exercise its discre-
tion and grant a stay of at least the part involving disclosure of a
113. Id. See 98 F.T.C. at 405-06.
114. 695 F.2d at 712. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
115. 695 F.2d at 712 n.49.
116. Id. at 712-13.
117. Id. at 713.
118. Id. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976) (court over-
turned excision of phrase sought by FTC, stating that qualifying explanatory language is
preferred remedy). See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (attorney advertising case in
which Court reiterated that it is preferable for states when regulating misleading advertising
to require disclaimers and explanations); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(recognizing warnings or disclaimers might be required in attorney advertising to assure
consumers are not misled); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmacist permitted to advertise prescription drug
prices which, if found to be misleading, could be dealt with effectively by state).
119. See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1977)
(first amendment does not prohibit intervention by State when advertising is misleading or
deceptive); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 (1976) ("the [f]irst [a]mendment ... does not prohibit the State from insur-
ing that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely").
120. 695 F.2d at 714.
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substantial question in the absence of clinical support, until the
resolution of proceedings against AHP's competitors.1
2 1
The FTC has been regulating advertising since its creation by
the 63rd Congress in 1914, pursuant to its broad mandate to pre-
vent unfair methods of competition. 122 The courts early on tried to
restrict the Commission's jurisdiction to cases where injuries to
competitors could be demonstrated, 1 2 but Congress responded in
1938, with the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, clearly delegating to the
FTC a power of enforcement for the protection of consumers.'24 At
the same time, the Commission's arsenal of regulatory devices was
broadened with authority to obtain a temporary injunction when it
reasonably believed an advertisement for foods, drugs, or cosmetics
was false.
125
The one power withheld from the Commission, that of promul-
gating rules beyond mere housekeeping and definition of unlawful
practices, has meant that the Commission has had to establish its
interpretative and specific standards one case at a time.' 26 Accord-
ing to various studies conducted at intervals during the Commis-
sion's existence, 27 this method, combined with a Commission fail-
ure to establish priorities, led to crowded dockets involving trivial
offenses, orders affecting single violators only, and standards evolv-
121. Id.
122. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 H~av. L. REV. 1005, 1019
(1967) (the first case heard by a court involving the FTC, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258
F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919), concerned advertising practices found to be injurious to trade).
123. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (6th Cir. 1931) (the Commission
lacks jurisdiction where it can not show, in addition to injury to the public, that competition
has been adversely affected).
124. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments added sections 5, 12, and 15(a) to the FTCA, 15
U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52, 55(a)(1976). See Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False
Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 439, 444 (1964).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (b)(1976). See Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the
Federal Trade Commission, 17 KANS. L. REV. 559, 560 (1969) (indicating the FTC does not
use its preliminary injunctive powers).
126. See 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES §18.3 (1967); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1064.
But see National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, rev'd, 482 F.2d 672
(D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1972). Judge J. Skelly Wright broke new ground by
deciding, contrary to what Congress and the FTC had always believed, that the FTC does
have the power to promulgate substantive rules. This was not an advertising case.
127. See E. Cox, R. FELLMUTH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 44-45 (1969) (quoting the critical studies made of the FTC by G. Hen-
derson in 1924, the Hoover Commission in 1949, and Auerbach in 1964. But see Develop-
ments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1024 (finding there is judicial
reluctance to overrule Commission orders for lack of sufficient public interest because an
important legal principle or the credibility of the FTC may be at stake in even the most
minor cases).
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ing in a piecemeal fashion.128 Herein, perhaps, lies an explanation
for the lengthy opinion rendered by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in the instant case. Judge Adams conducted an exhaustive
study of deceptive advertising standards, writing, in effect, a trea-
tise which emphasizes unanimity with decisions in other circuits
and, perhaps, attempts to provide an antidote to a history of what
commentators have viewed as the FTC's failures and the judicial
complicity in that result.""9
The courts have been viewed as the branch of government re-
sponsible for preventing abuses by a growing administrative power
and presence.130 Administrative agencies are regarded as necessary
to the mediation of disputes between groups, hopefully before they
even arise, in a rapidly changing urban industrial society.' The
"fourth branch of government," with its unique combination of ex-
ecutive, judicial, and legislative powers was originally hailed for its
flexibility, expertise in specific fields, and potential for speedy rec-
ognition and control of complex problems.' In practice, however,
as exemplified by American Home Products Corp. v. FTC,' hear-
128. Contra Handler, Introduction to Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Trade Commission, 64 COLUM. L. Rsv. 385, 388 (1964) (finding the FTC provides
"yeoman" service for consumers and honest businessmen).
129. See 1 R. CALLmAN, supra note 126, at § 18.3 ("[t]hough the Commission has often
been criticized, it is true, as Professor McLaughlin stated, 'it must be conceded that the
courts have overlooked few reasonable opportunities to contribute to that result.' ") (quot-
ing McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUsT LAws 692 (1933)).
130. See generally R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942). Pound did not dispute the
need for administrative agencies and their exercise of power, rather, he addressed his argu-
ments against those who wanted to free agencies from judicial review and the constraints of
due process. He outlined legislative safeguards which would maintain the balance among the
branches of government and emphasized review of administrative action by the courts. A
recent major decision by the Supreme Court, INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), af-
firming, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1981), seems to have definitively reserved to the courts the
exclusive power to check the regulatory actions of federal agencies where Congress tries to
by-pass proper procedure and vetoes such action.
131. See R. POUND, supra note 130, at 20-21. See also F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC &
ITS GOVERNMENT (1930) (Justice Frankfurter strongly believed that government and admin-
istrative agencies were crucial to the functioning of an industrial society); and W. DOUGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 246 (1940) (the administrative agency is "the mechanism of demo-
cratic government whereby capitalism can discipline and preserve itself. . . . [I]t is in its
infancy, but it is here to stay").
132. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 131, at 241.
133. 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). See also NADER REPORT, supra note 127, at 75 ("an
investigation of the deceptive claims of analgesic companies began over a decade ago. [It]
resulted, primarily in four dismissed complaints, after years of tests and years of still con-




ings drag on for years as the economic climate changes 3" and the
official record becomes a Draconian form of punishment for those
required to read it. " '
Judge Adams read the lengthy record and followed the standard
of judicial review which has evolved, beginning with the decision in
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,5 6 requiring analysis of the sub-
stantial evidence in the record as a whole, when Commission find-
ings of fact are at issue. In a case where a battle of the experts
emerges and the meanings of words are disputed, the court is
forced to sift through the data almost as thoroughly as the Com-
mission does; but the court is required to defer to Commission
judgment where a weighing of evidence is necessary.1 37 This defer-
ence has been criticized in the area of deceptive advertising which
some compare to the old common law action of deceit, certainly
well within the expertise of the judiciary.138 The courts agree, how-
ever, that evidence of consumer beliefs is not required in FTC ad-
vertising cases,1 3 essentially because of the burden it would place
on a limited Commission budget;14 0 and hence, the courts have de-
cided to rely on Commission interpretations.1 4 1 Judge Adams made
134. See A Bitter Pill for Aspirin Makers, Bus. WK., July 5, 1982, at 78. Tylenol, a
non-aspirin analgesic, since its introduction in the 1960's as a non-prescription drug, has
steadily eroded aspirin's share of the market. By 1981, Tylenol sales represented 37% of the
$850 million spent on over-the-counter analgesics. Further, the recently discovered link be-
tween Reyes Syndrome, a children's disease with a 20-30% mortality rate, and the use of
aspirin is expected to have an impact on the industry if warnings are required on packaging.
135. See supra note 7. The A.L.J.'s findings and the Commission's opinion run several
hundred pages at 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), and petitioner's and respondent's briefs cite hun-
dreds of pages of appendix references in their arguments.
136. 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (construing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
10(e)(1946) and its applicability to the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)(1947)). See also
L. JAFFE, JUDICLLL CONTROL OF ADmiNisTRATv ACTION 600 (1965) for an analysis of the
impact on the law provided by this landmark case.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976) provides: "[tihe findings of the Commission as to the
facts, if supported by the evidence, shall be conclusive." See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); and cases cited by Judge Adams in American Home Products, 695
F.2d 681 at 686-87 n.6. See also Millstein, supra note 124, at 470.
138. See 1 R. CALLmAN, supra note 126, at 656; Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, supra note 122, at 1039.
139. See Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
1944) (order not improper on account of lack of consumer testimony, since actual deception
need not be shown in FTC proceedings) (citing FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483,
494 (1922) and other cases). But see Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior:
A Case for Legislative and Judicial Reform, 17 KANs. L. Rzv. 625, 636 (1969) (urging, in
fairness to innocent advertisers, that research on how consumers actually do interpret ad-
vertising should be required).
140. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1058.
141. Id. at 1039.
1983
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:273
no departure from this practice in his opinion. 4"
It is entirely possible that Commission findings of fact are influ-
enced by considerations beyond those appearing in the record. By
routinely deferring to agency expertise, the courts are not taking
notice of the role that improper ex parte communications some-
times play in agency findings and decisions."" Where the agency
has made a determination profoundly affecting the party it is in-
vestigating, however, such a danger would appear to be of minimal
importance with respect to the Commission's function as a public
watchdog.
144
Judge Adams upheld those parts of the Order substantially sup-
ported by the record as a whole and reasonably related to the vio-
lations found, and he struck down the one part which appeared to
lack such support.14 The excised part might have become a re-
straint on the rest of the over-the-counter drug industry, but be-
cause its relation to Anacin advertising was tenuous, the court
overruled it."'
142. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
143. Nelson, Two, Three, Many Rita Lavelles, 236 NATION 394 (1983) (describing the
ways in which ex parte meetings influence actions taken by the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration). See also E. FREUND, AD-
MINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 403 (1928) ("[t]he repression of private
action upon the basis of vaguely defined economic principles makes a considerable demand
upon administrative impartiality").
144. See Final Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,419 and 34,424 (1983) (FTC decisions regarding
AHP's competitors). It is interesting to note that the FTC retreated from the more rigorous
"substantial question" requirements of its Order against AHP. Sterling Drug, Inc. and Bris-
tol Myers Co. need not reveal the existence of a substantial question in the scientific-medi-
cal community with respect to certain advertising claims, but may make such claims if pos-
sessing a reasonable basis to support them. Commissioners Pertchuk and Bailey dissented
from this new majority position and indicated it is a reversal of the American Home Prod-
ucts doctrine and necessarily reverses parts of the American Home Products decision. The
return to the Pfizer standard means advertisers will be able to continue to make compara-
tive claims, distinguishing virtually identical products. Id. at 34,423.
145. See 695 F.2d at 710-711 (discussing Part II(D) of the Order which prohibited any
non-comparative claims of effectiveness or freedom from side-effects for non-prescription
drug products unless there is a reasonable basis for such claims). See supra notes 106-109
and accompanying text for the court's treatment of Part II(D) of the Commission's Order.
146. See generally FTC Staff Report, Advertising for Over-the-Counter Drugs (pre-
pared May 22, 1979) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 450). This report reviews research done
by the FTC staff and hearings conducted during the same period the FTC was proceeding
against AHP, involving some of the same experts and similar issues. The outcome of this
endeavor was a proposed Trade Regulation Rule which would require ads for non-prescrip-
tion drugs to convey the same information as that approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration on product labels and packaging, concerning indication-for-use claims. The report, in
places, argues along the same lines as respondent's brief and may have been the impetus
behind Part II(D) of the Order. If this part had withstood petitioner's challenge it would
have approximated the impact on over-the-counter drug advertising of the proposed regula-
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The due process and first amendment discussions in the case1 47
are familiar concerns in false advertising litigation. 4  Here, the
court was in traditional judicial territory and it can and did ensure
that the party before the A.L.J. received a fair hearing and was
subject only to constitutionally permissible restraints. It is true, as
AHP argued, 49  that the substantial question theory places a
greater burden on advertisers and that it is different from the Pfi-
zer standard.150 It is also true that the cases support an agency's
power to develop interpretative standards which are prospective in
operation during an adjudicative procedure. 1 ' If affirmed by the
court, the standards achieve precedential value in further litiga-
tion."52 From the standpoint of the regulated industry, this is not a
satisfactory legal background against which to devise an ad cam-
paign, for one could never be sure if a particular advertising
strategem were within the bounds of the law. On the other hand, it
would encourage advertisers to avoid the outer limits of false and
deceptive claims, something the industry itself proclaims as a
tion. To date, the proposed regulation has not been adopted by the Commission. Id.
147. 695 F.2d at 693-95, 712-14.
148. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977)
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (first amendment does not preclude state from ensuring
that commercial speech is free from deception). See also Staff Report, supra note 146, at
267-85 (discussing the impact of first amendment issues on deceptive advertising regula-
tions); NADER REPORT, supra note 127, at xiii (some corporate lawyers prefer irregularities in
formal administrative procedures so that agency decisions will be overruled in court on due
process grounds); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1027-
29 (courts consistently hold that deceptive advertising proscriptions do not violate first
amendment provisions).
149. Brief of Petitioner American Home Products Corporation at 20, American Home
Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (the substantial question theory looks to the scientific
and medical community and proof acceptable to its majority while the reasonable basis
standard looks at the reliability of evidence possessed by the advertiser who makes the
claim).
150. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972) (the reasonable basis doctrine requires adver-
tisers to possess the level of substantiation for advertising claims which is fair to consumers
and is based on the type of claim, the extent of consumer reliance on it, and the feasibility
of obtaining support for it). Id.
151. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947); Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert
denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). Agencies have discretion to choose the setting for announcing
new rules and standards; Judge Adams focused on the requirements of notice and whether
or not AHP had the opportunity to argue its position fully under the controlling theory. 695
F.2d at 693-95. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC,
673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) (FTC abused its discretion
by changing the law with widespread application in an adjudicative setting).
152. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 564 (1965) ("a de
facto rule-making power is recognized when a court approves (as it often does) a policy or
interpretation").
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goal, 53 although the present system does not seem to have
achieved such a result.
154
It could be argued that consumers should be aware that vendors
will make any claim to sell their products, but because of the
unique nature of over-the-counter drugs and the state of advertis-
ing in modern America, with its impact on those subjected to its
unrelenting presence in all forms of the media,155 caveat emptor
has given way to caveat venditor. " Thus, the most ignorant con-
sumer is protected and under no duty to act wisely in the face of
false advertisements which induce a purchase.
1 5 7
Such a theory is so integral to this area of law, that Judge Ad-
ams took no notice of it. He did state categorically, citing no au-
thority, that over-the-counter drugs are susceptible to objective
comparison testing. 58 Counsel for the FTC indicated that there
can be no "absolute proof" of comparative claims even though cer-
tain procedures can be employed when testing analgesic products
153. See J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 159 (1967) (this work, funded by
a grant from the Association of National Advertisers, generally lauded advertising's benefits
to a capitalist society, but cautioned that "[e]very piece of advertising does not lead to...
benefits. Certainly there is wide agreement that misleading advertising must be pro-
scribed."); 1 R. CALLMAN, supra note 126, at § 19.2(b)(3) (indicating that medicine ads with
scientific explanations and claims insufficiently supported by accepted authority are "unfair
to the public" and tend to "discredit advertising.") (quoting the Association of National
Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising Agencies appearing at Handler,
The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAW & CONTrMr . PROBS.
91, 101 (1939)).
154. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION-25, 152
(1976) (reporting a study conducted by a public interest law firm affiliated with Georgetown
University which found 60% of ads by television manufacturers were inadequately substan-
tiated; an ad substantiation program initiated by the FTC in 1971, turned up a 30% rate of
questionable claims).
155. See 695 F.2d at 708, n.43; supra note 102. See also R. NADER, supra note 154, at
24 (the average adult views 40,000 commericals a year on television and the leading 100
national advertisers spent $3.6 billion in 1974 to influence purchasing decisions); Staff Re-
port, supra note 146, at 66-73 (analyzing what experts have found is "low-involvement" on
the part of viewers of advertisements, characterized by a lack of perceptual defenses to the
repetitive messages conveyed); id. at 55 (a study of 1321 people showed 43% got their infor-
mation on over-the-counter drugs from advertising).
156. See 1 R. CALLMAN, supra note 126, at § 19.1(f) (the duty to reveal enough mate-
rial facts to negate misleading implications is an important exception to the rule of caveat
emptor and is triggered when the defendant speaks at all); LeViness, Caveat Emptor Versus
Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REV. 177 (1943).
157. See Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) (FTC
may insist upon literal truthfulness in advertising); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d
33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1940) (FTC can insist advertising is clear
enough not to deceive "fools"). See also Staff Report, supra note 146, at 13-15; Millstein
supra note 124, at 460.
158. 695 F.2d at 697. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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which reduce the possibility of error to an "acceptable mini-
mum.'' " Given, moreover, the emphasis on placebo effects, the
"self-limiting" nature of many kinds of pain for which analgesics
are used,160 and what the FTC has found and described as the sub-
jectivity involved when individuals verbalize their physical condi-
tion,16' it is difficult to understand why Judge Adams believes su-
periority and freedom from side effects claims are factual and
testable, even though he acknowledges the difficulty of verifying
these claims. Such a belief merely perpetuates the propensity of
advertising copywriters to differentiate products that are identi-
cal162 while adopting "proof' based on threshold levels of substan-
tiation,163 or encourages advertisers to switch to other equally un-
informative forms of advertising because such substantiation can
never be achieved. The FTC and the courts would provide better
protection for consumers if they took notice of the inutility of any
such claims for duplicate over-the-counter internal analgesic
preparations.
Further, Judge Adams appears to believe, with the FTC, that
the over-the-counter drug industry itself is in the best position to
conduct properly controlled clinical studies in an effort to substan-
tiate advertising claims and is capable of doing so.1" Although
there is no way to determine how widespread is the practice of im-
proper clinical investigation and fictitious reporting, the Food and
Drug Administration twice reported in 1982 that industry paid in-
vestigators were charged, convicted, fined, and imprisoned for not
159. See Brief for Respondent at 6 n.5, American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695
F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).
160. 695 F.2d at 698.
161. See Staff Report, supra note 146, at 121-22.
162. See NADER REPORT, supra note 127, at 21 (stating that advertising distinguishes
products that are identical and that Americans pay billions every year to be told that these
contrived distinctions exist); R. NADER, supra note 154, at 208 (noting the costs of ad cam-
paigns that sell brand name recognition resulting in brand name aspirin costing as much as
three times more than store brand versions of the same thing); Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1047.
163. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 159, at 6 n.5 ("[tiwo clinical tests constitute
the threshold at which most scientists will consider a comparative drug efficacy claim to be
established for working purposes.") (emphasis in original).
164. See 695 F.2d at 714-15. Part I(B) of the Order sets forth the clinical testing re-
quirements with which AHP must comply when making superiority or freedom from side
effects claims. Independent experts are supposed to conduct such tests, but if they are not
reimbursed for their efforts or directed by the manufacturer seeking to establish support for
its product claims, what then is their incentive for undertaking product comparisons and
investigations? See generally Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (manufacturer can more easily
confirm product claims than individual consumers).
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following written protocol and for falsifying data while testing the
safety and effectiveness of new drugs.1" The industry may be in a
better position to verify its affirmative product claims vis-a-vis the
consumer, but the agencies responsible for overseeing the truthful-
ness of advertising and labeling claims are further burdened with
investigating the professionals who conduct the clinical tests back-
ing those claims.
These assumptions are potentially serious flaws in an otherwise
conservative and reasonable outcome for a business at the top of
the drug industry1" with an opportunity to take the lead and en-
sure that the "stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly.' 167 AHP either agreed with the outcome or believed that
further judicial consideration would be fruitless, because no appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court."6 8 The disclosure requirements,
well supported by holdings in recent cases, 69 and the substantia-
tion requirements produced after ten years of hearings and appeals
are still in abeyance as the Commission stayed the Order pending
disposition of the petition to reopen filed by AHP. 170 It is almost
as if no action had been taken at all and AHP has been free in the
intervening years to continue its conduct unfettered.' 7 ' By not em-
165. Ballentine, Lies Add Up to a Year In Prison, FDA CoNs., May, 1982, at 26; In-
vestigators' Reports, Dalton's Deception, FDA CoNs., November, 1982, at 27. See M. Dowie,
D. Foster, C. Marshall, D. Weir, J. King, The Illusion of Safety (1982) (investigative project
of Foundation for National Progress and the Center for Investigative Reporting). This group
of articles, in part, discusses incidents of irregularities uncovered by the FTC involving
product testing by research laboratories.
166. AHP reported profits in 1981 of $497 million, which placed it ahead of all other
drug manufacturers, A Research Spending Surge Defies Recession, Bus. WK., July 5, 1982,
at 59, 62.
167. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 (1976).
168. Letter from David S. Versfelt, Esq. to Dale Elizabeth Walker (April 11, 1983)
(stating AHP was filing a petition to reopen with the FTC in lieu of seeking Supreme Court
review). Review on a second appellate level is essentially a review of the reasonableness of
the first reviewing court's disposition of the case. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
169. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
170. Letter from Benjamin I. Berman, Acting Secretary, FTC, to Samuel W. Murphy,
Jr., Esq. (March 18, 1983) (the Commission modified the Order in accordance with the
Third Circuit opinion, but stayed its effect until September 30, 1983 or 90 days following
disposition of the petition to reopen, whichever is later).
171. Judge Adams noted that tension relief claims ceased in 1973. See 695 F.2d at 703
n.38. During the first half of 1983, Anacin advertising on the major television networks had
abandoned comparative claims, relying instead on the endorsement of a renowned actress




ploying its extraordinary powers, the FTC has had to settle for mi-
nor progress with little measurable effect to date.
The FTC long lacked or did not use the power to promulgate
rules for regulating the industry practices it is charged with polic-
ing. 7  Hence, it developed its body of unfair trade precepts on a
case-by-case basis with a cautious judiciary ever ready and availa-
ble to approve, limit, modify, or overturn final Commission orders.
The result, as illustrated by American Home Products Corp. v.
FTC,1 7' and as noted by commentators,17 4 is a nearly seventy year
history of, at best, marginal success in curbing advertising excesses.
Business acts, the FTC reacts, and after years of hearings, testi-
mony from dozens of experts, and a series of appeals, the courts
decide whether or not the Commission has exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, has the expertise or evidence to back its findings, or has mis-
applied the law or acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In
the meantime, the market changes, advertising campaigns continue
to deceive or shift gear, and countless other industries push their
puffing beyond the limits of legality in an environment where it
may not be profitable to do otherwise.
1 75
The courts have the power to give Commission rulings the force
of law, and they have the power to curb forward-looking industry-
wide regulatory standards. The court in the instant case has exer-
cised both kinds of power. In the process, it has produced a stan-
dard treatise on administrative law and deceptive advertising and
continued the judicial trend of pirouetting around a representative
of the "fourth branch of government." With its painstaking review,
the court has provided an important check on the Commission's
effort to advance over-the-counter drug advertising regulation, but
172. See supra note 126, for analysis of the action taken by Judge J. Skelly Wright in
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, rev'd., 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1973). See also Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612
F.2d 658, 670 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that this was the first case to
be decided under the FTC's "newly confirmed" authority to enact substantive rules as first
decided by the National Petroleum court and finally settled by Congress in 1975 with the
passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1976)).
173. 695 F.2d 681.
174. See supra notes 127 and 129.
175. See J. BACKMAN, supra note 153, at 63-68 (recording the relatively high costs of
advertising and promotion of drugs and the intensity of competition among leading manu-
facturers to remain on top of the industry); Charlton & Fawcett, The FTC and False Adver-
tising, 17 KANs. L. REv. 599, 601 (1969) ("[t]he need for deception is an outgrowth of the
fierce sales competition by giant companies ... and its rationale is the protection of mil-
lions of promotional dollars that each company stakes on its products.") (quoting Sm.DIN,
THE GOLDEN FLEECE 2 (1962)).
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at the same time it has guaranteed that a cumbersome and expen-
sive system will remain in a torpid state.
A more liberal use of and judicial support for the temporary pre-
liminary injunction, more realistic framing of cease and desist
orders,17 7  and vigorous Commission adoption of meticulously
drafted Trade Regulation Rules17 8 should go a long way toward
eliminating advertising practices injurious to competition and con-
sumer health and safety. If this is a goal which advertisers and the
public believe is best achieved by government supervision and reg-
ulation,1 79 then it should not take ten years of proceedings at tax-
payers' and consumers' expense to require a manufacturer to dis-
close the contents of its product and to prove its claims are
substantiated to the satisfaction of the agency with authority to
ensure truth in advertising.
Dale Elizabeth Walker
176. 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (this power is considered to be an extraordinary and drastic
measure; it is difficult to find more than a few cases where the FTC has even attempted to
use it to regulate advertising). See MILLSTEIN, supra note 124, at 493 (urging strict limita-
tions on its use). If advertisers were subjected to interruptions in their advertising cam-
paigns, it would necessarily be economically prudent for them to be more circumspect with
regard to the kinds of claims they make about their products.
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at 1091-95.
179. J. HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MN 98 (1963) (a critic of the role of advertising in
society, Jules Henry recommended that the government treat advertising as a public utility
and regulate it as such).
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